GitHub Actions allows users to build, test, and deploy code right from GitHub. Action workflows are configured directly in the repository. Self-hosted runners are available for users who require custom hardware configuration or operating systems not offered by GitHub-hosted runners.
Each repository in GitHub Actions is isolated from one another. Each job runs in a tenant which only contains resources for that single repository. It should not be possible to access resources from another repository’s job.
GitHub Actions have a GitHub token available to them. This token is scoped to the repository from which the workflow is run. This token should not be able to access private content outside of that repository or beyond the permissions listed in the documentation.
GitHub Actions provides a mechanism for GitHub.com to store secrets associated with a repository. Upon invocation of a workflow, the secrets are fetched, decrypted, then made accessible to each workflow run.
GitHub Apps and OAuth apps should not be able to edit the workflow file in the repository. If an attacker is able to modify the workflow file then they gain access to secrets stored in the repository. This could allow an attacker to escalate their privileges if the application performing the editing has less permissions than the GitHub token accessible within the runtime environment.
Official actions in the
To prevent accidental disclosure of secrets, GitHub Actions includes a mechanism to sanitize any encrypted secrets that appear in build logs. Our mechanism attempts to match any secrets in common encodings, such as plaintext, base64, etc. It is not designed to prevent users intentionally disclosing secrets in non-standard encodings and is therefore ineligible for reward.
Intentionally misusing CPU, memory or network limits of GitHub Actions is a known issue. We take abuse and spam seriously and have a dedicated team that tracks spammy users. Therefore, this is ineligible for reward.
A GitHub Actions build will intentionally have access to many resources including, but not limited to:
Access to these resources is expected and not eligible for a reward. However, if these primitives can be abused to access resources of other repositories or users then this would be eligible for reward.
Downloading build artifacts requires
read access to a repository. When a user with
read access clicks the download button, they will be given a link containing a signed token that is no longer tied to the user session. This is expected behavior and ineligible for reward.
|1||10000 pts Vlad Ionescu GitHub Actions secret leak|